By : Taufik Rachmat Nugraha, Research Fellow at Centre for Air and Space Policy (CASP)––trn.casp@outlook.com
In recent developments, space technology has the potential to enhance navigation safety towards a Low Earth Orbit constellation, offering high accuracy with remarkably low latency. This technology also ensures greater robustness against stronger satellite signals and introduces innovative signal encryption methods that are more resistant to spoofing during data transmission between ships and satellites, as well as in ship-to-berth communications. These advantages can also mitigate the risks of piracy for technologies that employ integrated navigation systems, such as e-Navigation and autonomous vessels, which are particularly susceptible to hacking attempts that could lead to significant damage or loss for the vessel or nearby ships.
Another issue is about Ship-to-Ship Transfer (STS) illegally especially by Russian oil tanker after European Union impose a sanction towards Russian flag vessel, besides that, in Iranian and Cameroon flagged vessel (Arman 114 and S Tinos) are allegedly doing STS by turning off their Automatic Identification System (AIS) and going dark to avoid any coastal states jurisdiction exercise and resulted coastal state cannot detect the location of vessels.
Additionally, Rivada, Starlink, OneWeb, and HawkEye 360 are just a few examples of satellite and telecommunications providers catering to the maritime sector. Most of these providers emphasize the advantages of their technologies, which include exceptionally high accuracy and extremely low latency comparable to terrestrial fiber optic cables. They offer global coverage, even extending into polar regions, making them invaluable for supporting Arctic sea lanes. Furthermore, their capabilities allow for illegal ship tracking using electronic emissions, representing cutting-edge advancements that can significantly enhance maritime safety and security.
The advantage of LEO satellite is not solely dedicated for the vessel, but its seafarers can enjoy its advantage such as they can always connected with their relatives, better health protection through tele-medicine, which can resulted positive impact on their wellbeing and health during the long period of voyage as regulated under Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MLC 2006) Guideline B 3.1.11 on Recreational facilities, mail and ship visit arrangements and Regulation 4.1 (Standard 4.1 on medical care on board ship and ashore) can be fulfilled more comfortably.
There is a significant concern regarding the enhancement of safety and security for navigation, particularly in congested areas such as the Malacca Strait, Singapore Strait, Sunda Strait, and Lombok Strait. These straits are characterised by their narrowness and inherent high risk of accidents and illicit activities during maritime passage, as well as before entering these waters.
Under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974, particularly in Chapter V concerning the Safety of Navigation and Regulations 7, 8, 9, and 12, it is mandated that vessels exceeding 1,600 gross tons are equipped with radar and radiotelephone systems capable of distress communication. This regulation is increasingly relevant to emerging space technologies, as all signals will be transmitted and received by radars installed on vessels in an appropriate manner.
Furthermore, the Law of the Sea Convention 1982 (LOSC) establishes under Article 21 that coastal states may adopt laws and regulations on the safety of navigation as well as maritime traffic regulations, including the protection of navigational aids and other facilities relevant to safe navigation. A pertinent question arises regarding the definition of navigational aids as referenced in Article 21. Can maritime-dedicated satellites be classified as Aids to Navigation (AtoN), given that they provide essential data for navigation systems such as Electronic Charts Display and Information System (ECDIS) and Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) utilised on the bridge? Alternatively, does this definition extend solely to systems like e-navigation infrastructures and ECDIS?
Additionally, Article 43(a) and (b) of the LOSC emphasise that for straits utilised for international navigation, coastal states are required to ensure the safety and security of navigation for all vessels passing through their waters. This can be achieved by establishing and maintaining necessary navigational and safety aids or implementing other improvements that facilitate international navigation, as well as for the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution originating from ships.
Since flag states have jurisdiction and connection to the vessels flying its flag then under Art 94 para 3 (c) that stated “…shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to: the use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention of collisions…” and para 4 (a) “…that each ship before registration is surveyed by a qualified surveyor of ships… and has on board such charts, nautical publications and navigational equipment and instruments as are appropriate for the safe navigation of the ship…”
Following SOLAS 1974 and LOSC, flag states are required to adhere to substantive regulations concerning the safety and security of navigation by ensuring that each vessel registered under their flag is equipped with radar. However, questions arise regarding the implementation of e-navigation, which has recently been introduced and adopted by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). Additionally, there are queries about the readiness of the LEO-Sat mega constellation to support the advancement of maritime navigation.
Author : Taufik Rachmat Nugraha, Research Fellow at Centre for Air and Space Policy (CASP)––trn.casp@outlook.com